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THE DESIRE FOR GOD AND THE LOVE 
OF LEARNING: A SKETCH OF PLATO 
AND ARISTOTLE 
Michael W. Strasser 
The s t u d i e s o f mediaeval h i s t o r i a n s s i n c e the b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s century 
have made the o r i g i n a l i t y o f the Middle Ages so c l e a r t o us t h a t we are now 
i n danger o f f o r g e t t i n g the c o n t i n u i t y o f the mediaeval world with t h a t o f 
C l a s s i c a l Greece. One s i m i l a r i t y between these two p e r i o d s t h a t seems worthy 
o f e x p l o r a t i o n i s t h e i r common c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a man's i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e 
depends i n some o r i g i n a t i v e way upon h i s moral l i f e . * 
As f a r as the Middle Ages are concerned, t h i s c o n v i c t i o n i s so w e l l -
known as to need no f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t i o n . A f t e r a l l , the most w i d e l y read 
o f a l l p h i l o s o p h i c a l works i n t h a t p e r i o d was the d i a l o g u e Boethius wrote 
w h i l e i n p r i s o n . He p o r t r a y s Lady Philosophy appearing to him f o r h i s 
c o n s o l a t i o n . In the bottom hem o f her garments there i s interwoven a Greek 
n which stands f o r p r a c t i c a l wisdom. In the uppermost hem there i s a Greek 
9 r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l wisdom. In between these two l e t t e r s there were 
r e p r e s e n t e d the s t e p s by which one c o u l d ascend from the lower to the higher.' 
But, b e f o r e Boethius, the f a c t t h a t St Augustine's i n t e l l e c t u a l f l o w e r -
i n g r e s u l t e d from the c a t a l y s t o f h i s moral conversion s i x t e e n hundred years 
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ago i s there f o r a l l to see and wonder a t . What i s n o t i c e d l e s s o f t e n i s 
t h a t P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e a l s o c o n s i d e r e d the morally good l i f e t o be a con-
d i t i o n f o r the approach to wisdom. 
That i s the reason f o r the t i t l e o f t h i s paper': j u s t as Augustine's 
d e s i r e f o r God was the m a t r i x w i t h i n which h i s l e a r n i n g was conceived, t h a t 
i s to say, h i s s e r i o u s and t h e r e f o r e recorded l e a r n i n g , so too something l i k e 
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t h i s was n o t unknown to the g r e a t e s t o f the Greek p h i l o s o p h e r s . The opening 
language o f my t i t l e i s b i b l i c a l , i n homage to S t Augustine; but, as the sub-
t i t l e i n d i c a t e s , t h i s i s no more than a s h o r t account o f the g r e a t e s t o f h i s 
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Greek p r e d e c e s s o r s . 
Nor i s t h i s to say t h a t we have any p r e c i s e b i o g r a p h i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n on 
a c o n v e r s i o n o f P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e to the p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i f e — although 
one s c h o l a r has s a i d t h a t t h i s i s e x a c t l y what Socrates was t r y i n g t o accom-
p l i s h . He maintains t h a t i n the C l a s s i c a l world "a person was c o n v e r t e d to 
p h i l o s o p h y , j u s t as one i s converted to C h r i s t i a n i t y , and t h i s c o n v e r s i o n 
s i g n i f i e d i n the mind and i n the h e a r t o f those who accomplished i t both a 
r e v e r s a l o f v a l u e s and the beginning o f a new e x i s t e n c e . " 5 Werner Jaeger 
has s a i d t h a t "the essence o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l e d u c a t i o n i s ' c o n v e r s i o n 1 which 
l i t e r a l l y means ' t u r n i n g round'." 6 Meanwhile, P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e do supply 
us w i t h a few f a c t s and a number o f t e x t s which suggest t h a t f o r them the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i f e does indeed b e g i n i n e t h i c a l l y good behaviour. 
Looking a t the f a c t s f i r s t , we remember t h a t Socrates was executed i n 
Athens i n 399 B.C. As P l a t o t e l l s i t , Socrates had to d r i n k the hemlock 
because he f e l t more c o n s t r a i n e d to f o l l o w the words o f the god, A p o l l o , 
and h i s own conscience than the words o f the men who would condemn him f o r 
c o n t i n u i n g to p h i l o s o p h i z e . 7 A few years l a t e r , one o f h i s f o l l o w e r s , P l a t o , 
r e t u r n e d t o t h a t same c i t y t o openly inaugurate i n the Academy h i s own s c h o o l 
i n which he took up i n h i s own way the dangerous work o f S o c r a t e s . I n the 
next g e n e r a t i o n , P l a t o ' s p u p i l , A r i s t o t l e , came back t o t h a t self-same c i t y 
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to h o l d up b e f o r e the Athenians the S o c r a t i c f i g u r e o f a magnanimous man. 
For P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e to have had such a p a s s i o n f o r wisdom i n the f u l l 
l i g h t o f what such a p a s s i o n might c o s t shows us t h a t they were not merely 
p r o f e s s o r s o f p h i l o s o p h y ; they were men making a p u b l i c p r o f e s s i o n o f t h e i r 
love o f wisdom. By having the courage to walk i n the f o o t s t e p s o f S o c r a t e s , 
through the very c i t y t h a t had j u d i c i a l l y murdered him, P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e 
demonstrated t h a t they were what Thomas Aquinas would l a t e r c a l l "proven 
men. 
T h i s moral o r e t h i c a l o r even r e l i g i o u s s i d e o f the p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i f e 
i s so o l d t h a t i t looks l i k e new. On the o t h e r hand, i n most o f today's 
c o l l e g e s and u n i v e r s i t i e s , p hilosophy — which f o r the Greeks i n c l u d e d a l l 
o f the l i b e r a l a r t s — c o n s t i t u t e s simply one group o f s u b j e c t s a l o n g s i d e 
a l l the o t h e r s i n the smorgasbord* 0 we o f f e r our s t u d e n t s . E t i e n n e G i l s o n 
has s a i d t h a t i n none o f the philosophy examinations i n which he had 
p a r t i c i p a t e d over a very long c a r e e r had he ever overheard "a s i n g l e 
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examiner a s k i n g any candidate: 'Well, do you l o v e wisdom?'" 1 1 To us the 
q u e s t i o n i s out o f p l a c e and out o f date. For Socrates i t was the most 
fundamental o f a l l q u e s t i o n s . And he knew, b e t t e r than most, t h a t the 
c o r r e c t answer to that q u e s t i o n c o u l d be a matter o f l i f e o r death. 
what makes S o c r a t e s ' q u e s t i o n so u n s e t t l i n g i s t h a t i t i s not merely 
about which s u b j e c t s we should study i n comparison to any o t h e r s . I t i s 
much more b a s i c ; i t asks, who i s the happy man and who i s not? Who i s 
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l i v i n g the b e t t e r l i f e and who i s not? In o t h e r words, he i s asking: 
which way o f l i f e i s most human i n comparison with a l l o t h e r ways o f l i f e ? 
I t cannot c o n s i s t i n the mere p u r s u i t o f p l e a s u r e , as good and even as 
necessary as a c e r t a i n amount o f d e l i g h t i s f o r human l i f e ; f o r the v a r i o u s 
p l e a s u r e s have themselves to be s o r t e d out i n o r d e r to f i n d the b e s t . T h i s 
immediately r e q u i r e s a c r i t e r i o n o u t s i d e o f them, and even C a l l i c l e s knew 
t h a t some enjoyments were harmful and others b e n e f i c i a l . 1 3 Nor can i t be a 
l i f e w holly devoted to wealth, s i n c e money, important though i t be, i s o n l y 
a means to s u r v i v a l . N e i t h e r can i t be f o r the sake o f a f i n e r e p u t a t i o n , 
although everyone who has one enjoys i t , s i n c e t h a t i s c o n f e r r e d o n l y as 
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the reward f o r some presumed p e r s o n a l e x c e l l e n c e . I t remains, then, t h a t 
o n l y p e r s o n a l e x c e l l e n c e , both moral and i n t e l l e c t u a l , ought to be the g o a l 
o f our s t r i v i n g so t h a t as f a r as p o s s i b l e e v e r y t h i n g we do o r think w i l l 
be i n a c c o r d w i t h a t r u l y human l i f e . 1 5 
In f a c t , t o the Greeks such a l i f e w i l l be more than human. For, j u s t 
as w r i t e r s and statesmen seek to be immortal i n the memory o f o t h e r s and a l l 
l i v i n g t h i n g s s t r i v e f o r i m m o r t a l i t y through t h e i r g e n e r a t i o n o f o f f s p r i n g , 
the p h i l o s o p h e r i s a l s o i n love with what i s immortal by c u l t i v a t i n g and 
u s i n g the b e s t t h i n g i n him, h i s mind. And one reason f o r s a y i n g t h a t the 
mind has a share o f i m m o r t a l i t y and even o f d i v i n i t y i s t h a t i t can know 
o b j e c t s t h a t are immortal and d i v i n e . 1 6 
The g o a l o f human e f f o r t , both i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l , i s the same f o r 
P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e . I t i s the b e s t , says P l a t o , 1 7 t h a t a l l l e g i s l a t i o n 
s h o u l d aim a t . But, "There are two d i f f e r e n t kinds o f good t h i n g s , the 
merely human and the d i v i n e ; the former are c o n s e q u e n t i a l on the l a t t e r . 
Hence the c i t y which accepts the g r e a t e r goods a c q u i r e s the l e s s e r along 
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with them, but one which r e f u s e s them misses both." And elsewhere: "That 
i s why we s h o u l d make a l l speed to take f l i g h t from t h i s world to the o t h e r , 
and t h a t means becoming l i k e the d i v i n e so f a r as we can, and t h a t again i s 
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to become r i g h t e o u s with the h e l p o f wisdom." Human ch a r a c t e r ought to 
be modelled a f t e r "the d i v i n e and g o d l i k e , " 2 0 to which he adds: "For the 
26 
gods never n e g l e c t a man who i s e a g e r l y wanting to be j u s t and t o become as 
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l i k e a god as i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r a man to be by p r a c t i c i n g v i r t u e . " 
For P l a t o , then, i t i s by aiming a t the d i v i n e , the u n q u a l i f i e d l y good, 
t h a t human p e r f e c t i o n i s achieved. But, w h i l e t h i s knowledge o f the d i v i n e 
leads us to i m i t a t e i t , i t i s not a knowledge f o r the sake o f p r a c t i c e ; 
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P l a t o c a l l s i t p u r e l y i n t e l l e c t u a l (gnostike). I t s s o l e purpose i s a 
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knowledge o f the t r u t h . T h i s c a p a c i t y f o r " b e a u t i f u l and f r e e d i s c u s s i o n s " 
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i s the most d i f f i c u l t p a r t o f p h i l o s o p h y ; i t i s t h e r e f o r e r a r e l y seen and 
f l o u r i s h e s o n l y i n m a t u r i t y . The premature involvement i n t h i s k i n d o f d i s -
c u s s i o n w i l l be i n c l i n e d t o lawlessness r a t h e r than moderation; i t w i l l be 
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used as a game and f o r the sake o f winning arguments. In f a c t , t h i s k i n d 
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o f d i s c u s s i o n can be c a r r i e d on o n l y "among f r i e n d s w i t h good w i l l . " 
F o r A r i s t o t l e , w e l l - b e i n g " i s c e r t a i n l y the c h i e f end o f i n d i v i d u a l s 
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and o f c i t y - s t a t e s . " I t f o l l o w s , then, t h a t " v i r t u e must be the care o f 
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a s t a t e which i s t r u l y so c a l l e d . " He goes on: 
I f we are r i g h t i n our view, and happiness i s assumed to be 
v i r t u o u s a c t i v i t y , the a c t i v e l i f e w i l l be the b e s t , both f o r every 
c i t y c o l l e c t i v e l y and f o r i n d i v i d u a l s . Not t h a t a l i f e o f a c t i o n 
must n e c e s s a r i l y have r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r s , as some persons t h i n k , 
nor are those ideas o n l y to be regarded as p r a c t i c a l which are 
pursued f o r the sake o f p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t s , but much more the 
thoughts and contemplations which are independent and complete i n 
themselves; s i n c e v i r t u o u s a c t i v i t y , and t h e r e f o r e a c e r t a i n k i n d 
o f a c t i o n , i s an end, and even i n the case o f e x t e r n a l a c t i o n s the 
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d i r e c t i n g (architektonas) mind i s most t r u l y s a i d to a c t . 
T h i s i s c l e a r l y a r e f e r e n c e t o " t h a t which i s most t r u l y the master 
a r t " : 
And p o l i t i c s appears to be o f t h i s nature; f o r i t i s t h i s t h a t 
o r d a i n s which o f the s c i e n c e s s h o u l d be s t u d i e d i n a s t a t e , and 
which each c l a s s o f c i t i z e n s s h o u l d l e a r n and up to what p o i n t 
they s h o u l d l e a r n them; and we see even the most h i g h l y esteemed 
o f c a p a c i t i e s to f a l l under t h i s , e.g. s t r a t e g y , economics, 
r h e t o r i c ; now, s i n c e p o l i t i c s uses the r e s t o f the s c i e n c e s , and 
s i n c e , again, i t l e g i s l a t e s as to what we are to do and what we 
are to a b s t a i n from, the end o f t h i s s c i e n c e must i n c l u d e those 
o f the o t h e r s , so t h a t t h i s end must be the good f o r man. 3 0 
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Now the good f o r man, h i s happiness, turns out to be a c t i v i t y " i n 
accordance with the h i g h e s t v i r t u e " ; and " t h i s a c t i v i t y i s contemplative" 
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( t h e o r e t i t o s ) . But t h i s a c t i v i t y depends on l e i s u r e . And l e i s u r e i t -
s e l f needs to be supported by many n e c e s s i t i e s o f l i f e along with the moral 
v i r t u e s . Indeed, "those then who seem to be the b e s t - o f f and to be i n the 
p o s s e s s i o n o f every good, have s p e c i a l need o f j u s t i c e and temperance, and 
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a l l the more the more l e i s u r e they have, l i v i n g i n the midst o f abundance." 
For A r i s t o t l e as f o r P l a t o , p r a c t i c a l wisdom and the other moral v i r t u e s 
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are c u l t i v a t e d f o r the sake o f engaging i n t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t y . What i s 
more, t h i s k i n d o f a c t i v i t y i s i n g r e a t e r need o f v i r t u o u s c h a r a c t e r than 
any o t h e r . 
T h i s i s a s h o r t account o f what i n r e a l i t y i s a long i t i n e r a r y from 
the vague presentiment o f happiness to some knowledge o f what i s d e a t h l e s s 
and above the merely human. In f a c t , i t seems to r e q u i r e a t l e a s t three 
s u c c e s s i v e s t e p s . F i r s t there i s the i n c l i n a t i o n toward what i s good simply 
because i t i s f i t t i n g . Secondly, there i s a c u l t i v a t i o n o f a l l the moral 
v i r t u e s , s e l f - c o n t r o l , j u s t i c e , courage and p r a c t i c a l wisdom. T h i r d l y , once 
the s o u l i s thus c u l t i v a t e d "by means o f h a b i t s f o r noble joy and noble 
h a t r e d , " i t w i l l be " l i k e e a r t h which i s to n o u r i s h the seed" and then i t 
w i l l b r i n g f o r t h "the most f r u i t f u l d i s c o u r s e and reap a golden h a r v e s t o f 
p h i l o s o p h y . " 3 6 What i s impressive here i s t h a t P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e , i n 
s p i t e o f a l l t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , see the p h i l o s o p h i c a l journey as f o l l o w i n g 
the same o r g a n i c sequence and they even use much o f the same language i n des-
c r i b i n g i t . 
The First Step 
The f i r s t s t e p i s a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l : i t i s the i n c l i n a t i o n o r the 
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d i s p o s i t i o n t o a s s e n t to the good simply because o f i t s i n t r i n s i c worth. 
Normally, i t i s p a r e n t s who t r y to i n s t i l l such a d i s p o s i t i o n i n t o t h e i r 
c h i l d r e n . But, f i n a l l y , o r r a t h e r i n i t i a l l y , i t i s each person w i t h i n the 
i s o l a t i o n o f h i m s e l f who has to make t h i s d e c i s i o n . 
The p r o b l e m a t i c c h a r a c t e r o f t h i s e n t i r e venture l i e s i n i t s dependence 
on t h i s c h o i c e . Do we choose the good simply because i t i s best f o r our 
p a r t i c u l a r s e l v e s ? To t a l k about what i s f i r s t here i s not a matter o f 
chronology. I t i s a q u e s t i o n o f c a u s a l i t y . Do we dare to want man's 
g r e a t e s t f u l f i l l m e n t i n the face o f our c l e a r inadequacies? That i s the 
q u e s t i o n . I f we do not want i t (God knows i f we understand what we are 
doing — f o r what we are doing seems c l o s e to the mystery surrounding moral 
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e v i l ) , we s h a l l never f i n d i t . That i s a hard s a y i n g . Yet, i t seems to be 
true i n the realm o f e t h i c a l knowledge: unless we tend to our true develop-
ment, we s h a l l not make the choices t h a t c a r r y us toward i t because we s h a l l 
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not know what they ought to be. 
A r i s t o t l e observed t h a t we use q u i t e d i f f e r e n t standards i n l e a r n i n g 
about q u a n t i t y and i n a s c e r t a i n i n g q u a l i t y . For the f i r s t , we always use 
some measure which i s a minimum; f o r example, i n measuring a s m a l l space we 
use inches and i n the case o f a very long d i s t a n c e we use m i l e s . On the 
c o n t r a r y , when we e v a l u a t e q u a l i t y we employ a maximum as our measure: i n 
the case o f s t a t e s we use the b e s t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s ; i n the f i e l d o f s c h o l a r -
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s h i p , the most s c h o l a r l y ; so, i n e t h i c s , i t must be the most e t h i c a l . 
T h e r e f o r e , i t i s o n l y i n view o f the most completely human s o r t o f l i f e t h a t 
we can make the r i g h t choice f o r o u r s e l v e s . 
Both authors seem to agree t h a t every human being needs the moral 
v i r t u e s i n o r d e r to achieve human happiness. Y e t , they say t h a t there i s 
another l e v e l o f happiness s u p e r i o r to t h i s : i t i s the p u r s u i t o f wisdom 
through a l i f e o f study. T h i s d e v o t i o n to reason, "the most d i v i n e element 
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i n us," f i n d s i t s f u l f i l l m e n t i n contemplative a c t i v i t y and contemplative 
knowing, as we f i n d i t i n the l i b e r a l a r t s . S i n c e i t i s l o v e d f o r i t s own 
j u i r 
42 
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sake, such a l i f e r e q e s l e i s u r e and t h e r e f o r e i t i s not l i k e l y to be 
pursued by most peopl e . 
The d i f f i c u l t y i n v o l v e d i n choosing t h i s s u p e r i o r type o f happiness 
becomes apparent when we l e a r n t h a t the b e t t e r o f any two things i s always 
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more s e r i o u s than i t i s amusing. T h i s f o l l o w s from the f a c t t h a t the more 
s e r i o u s a person i s the more i n t e n t l y he d i r e c t s h i s mind toward the t h i n g 
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he wants to know. Or, as P l a t o put i t even more b l u n t l y : winning the 
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t r u t h w i l l r e q u i r e t h a t one "work l i k e a s l a v e . " 
Yet, t h a t i s o n l y h a l f the s t o r y . Those s o b e r i n g words were a warning 
to the beginner, a l e r t i n g him to the f a c t t h a t the l i f e o f l e a r n i n g i s a 
slow and austere p r o c e s s . But, knowing i t s e l f i s the goal o f t h a t p r o c e s s ; 
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and human beings have an i n s a t i a b l e t h i r s t f o r knowledge. What i s more, 
j u s t as every a c t i v i t y has i t s own a t t e n d a n t p l e a s u r e when i t i s done w e l l , 
so too there are degrees o f enjoyment accompanying the v a r i o u s degrees o f 
knowledge. T h e r e f o r e , each knowing power w i l l have i t s most complete 
s a t i s f a c t i o n when i t i s i n the b e s t c o n d i t i o n and i s d i r e c t e d toward the 
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b e s t o f i t s o b j e c t s . I t f u r t h e r f o l l o w s t h a t s i n c e the a c t i v i t y i s i n -
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separable from our d e l i g h t i n i t , we o c c a s i o n a l l y f i n d o u r s e l v e s e x p l a i n -
i n g our presence i n the t e a c h i n g p r o f e s s i o n by t h a t very f a c t . Why d i d we 
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choose such an impecunious business? At l e a s t as o f t e n as not we p o i n t to 
i t s heady s a t i s f a c t i o n s . Those who do w e l l i n the work o f the h i s t o r i a n 
o r the mathematician o r the p h i l o s o p h e r would r a t h e r do t h a t job than e a t . 
T h i s i s j u s t as w e l l because t h a t i s e x a c t l y what they w i l l sometimes have 
to do. 
But, most important, those who choose a l i f e o f s c h o l a r s h i p do so be-
cause they know o f none more f i t t i n g f o r a r a t i o n a l animal. Yet, p r i o r t o 
our d i s c o v e r i n g i t s own c h a r a c t e r i s t i c joys and i t s i n t r i n s i c reasonableness, 
we are u s u a l l y persuaded by a person who i s pro b a b l y o l d e r than we and, 
seemingly, w i s e r . T h i s s o r t o f person appears t o be the very embodiment o f 
such a l i f e . For example, we cannot c l o s e our ea r s t o the words o f P l a t o as 
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he t r i e s to encourage us to have a " s t a b l e b e l i e f " about the good. How 
c o u l d he do t h i s ? A c c o r d i n g t o h i s student, A r i s t o t l e , by f i r s t o f a l l 
showing h i m s e l f to be a man o f good c h a r a c t e r . Most o f t e n , however, P l a t o 
has S o c r a t e s take h i s p l a c e . 
T h i s i s why P l a t o has Socrates d i a l o g u i n g with C a l l i c l e s i n the Gorgias 
and w i t h Thrasymachus i n the Republic. He wants t o persuade them through 
the example o f Socrates and the r a t i o n a l i t y o f h i s arguments t h a t a l i f e 
g i v e n t o p h i l o s o p h y i s the o n l y a c c e p t a b l e human l i f e . T h i s i s not to say 
t h a t t h i s k i n d o f encouragement (a protreptikos i n Greek o r an exhortatio i n 
L a t i n ) was always s u c c e s s f u l . I t cannot be accomplished by c o e r c i o n and i t 
can o n l y be a s s i s t e d by p e r s u a s i o n . In the end, each person must choose 
f o r h i m s e l f . 
A r i s t o t l e uses l e s s o f the h o r t a t o r y tone — no doubt because he was 
w r i t i n g f o r students who were a l r e a d y persuaded o f the val u e o f what they 
were d o i n g . N e v e r t h e l e s s , a t the beginning o f h i s Uicomachean Ethics he 
quotes H e s i o d to the e f f e c t t h a t a person who does not know " a l l things 
h i m s e l f " must listen "when men counsel r i g h t . " 5 * And, a t the end, he 
encourages h i s students to make themselves immortal and to " s t r a i n every 
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nerve t o l i v e i n accordance w i t h the b e s t t h i n g i n us." T h i s i s to say, 
they ought t o l i v e i n accordance with reason. 
The Second Step 
Assuming we have made the r i g h t i n i t i a l c h o i c e , what on e a r t h does the 
c u l t i v a t i o n o f the moral v i r t u e s have t o do with the growth o f the i n t e l l e c -
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t u a l v i r t u e s ? The answer i s simple. We are not born p h i l o s o p h e r s . We 
choose a c t i o n s t h a t are most agreeable t o our d i s p o s i t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , 
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o n l y the good man chooses "what i s i n accordance w i t h v i r t u e " because he 
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has c o n s c i o u s l y developed a d i s p o s i t i o n i n favour o f e x c e l l e n c e . T h i s 
p r a c t i c a l l y wise man w i l l be able t o d e l i b e r a t e w e l l not o n l y about what i s 
good i n t h i s o r th a t p a r t i c u l a r case but a l s o about the s o r t s o f things 
t h a t l e a d to the good l i f e i n g e n e r a l . 5 5 Meanwhile, h i s p r a c t i c a l wisdom 
w i l l be pr e s e r v e d by h i s s e l f - c o n t r o l . Conversely, the v i c i o u s man w i l l 
have made h i m s e l f b l i n d to the end o f human a c t i o n s and w i l l be o p e r a t i n g 
i n the d a r k . 5 6 
T h i s a p p l i e s to a l l the areas o f human conduct. The person who allows 
h i m s e l f to be d i s t r a c t e d by a l o n g i n g f o r s e l f - g r a t i f i c a t i o n o r s e l f -
aggrandizement has f a i l e d t o rec o g n i z e h i s t r u e s t s e l f , which i s l o c a t e d i n 
h i s r e a s o n . 5 7 Consequently, he w i l l not hear the "argument t h a t dissuades 
him, nor understand i t even i f he does hear i t . " What i s necessary i s t h a t 
b e f o r e h e a r i n g reasons, one must " a l r e a d y have a c h a r a c t e r w i t h an a f f i n i t y 
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f o r v i r t u e , l o v i n g what i s noble and h a t i n g what i s base." T h e r e f o r e , "a 
good man, s i n c e he l i v e s w i t h h i s mind f i x e d on what i s noble, w i l l submit 
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to reason." Having once d i r e c t e d h i s d e s i r e s toward what i s reasonable., 
and c l i n g i n g to i t , a person i s e a s i l y d i r e c t e d toward the r e a l i t y o f any-
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t h i n g . He i s now a f i t s tudent f o r the c u l t i v a t i o n o f the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
v i r t u e s o r philosophy as a l i f e o f l e a r n i n g . 
Everyone knows t h a t p h i l o s o p h y i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h i s , a k i n d o f l e a r n i n g . 
Love cannot be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r knowledge. And each o f the l i b e r a l a r t s 
has i t s own p r i n c i p l e s and i t s own methods. But, because t h e i r p r a c t i t i o n -
e rs must be submissive to reason and open t o argument, they must f i r s t o f 
a l l be d e d i c a t e d to the good o f reason which i s the t r u t h . And t r u t h needs 
us much l e s s than we need i t . T h e r e f o r e , the labours o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n and 
the h u m i l i t y to acknowledge whatever t r u t h i s d i s c o v e r e d no matter how 
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unwelcome r e q u i r e a d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s on the p a r t o f anyone who pursues 
t h i s k i n d o f wisdom. To put i t another way, because h i s areas o f research 
are obscure t o most people and t h e r e f o r e q u i t e f r e e o f o u t s i d e s c r u t i n y 
and a l s o because the i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r t u e s must be chosen l i k e the moral, 
f o r t h e i r own sake, the l o v e r o f wisdom ought t o " d e s i r e a l l wisdom, not 
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j u s t a p a r t o f i t . " A t the very l e a s t , t h i s may keep him honest. I t i s 
i n t h i s sense that the philia i n phil o s o p h y p r o v i d e s f o r the coming i n t o 
b e i n g o f i t s Sophia. 
But i f the p h i l o s o p h e r i s so wholly committed to t r u t h and wisdom i n 
both thought and a c t i o n , why i s he h e l d i n such low reg a r d today? P l a t o 
asks t h i s q u e s t i o n i n the Republic.^^ His answer has two p a r t s . He p o i n t s 
out f i r s t t h a t the gen e r a l p u b l i c i s simply not equipped t o comprehend t h i s 
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mode o f l i f e . But secondly he says, "the g r e a t e s t and c h i e f disparagement 
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of p h i l o s o p h y comes from those who pretend to t h a t way o f l i f e . " Instead 
o f p u r s u i n g the t r u t h "always and i n every way," these "impostors" have i n 
f a c t "nothing to do with true p h i l o s o p h y . " 6 5 
How c o u l d such a r e v e r s a l come about? I t happens, says P l a t o , when 
those who are most s u i t e d to philosophy abandon her. I t i s then t h a t e q u a l l y 
s m a l l men appear. Hoping to share i n the honour o f her name, they consort 
w i t h p h i l o s o p h y and b r i n g her i n t o d i s g r a c e . And what s o r t o f progeny do 
these men who are "unworthy o f education" produce? T h e i r o f f s p r i n g resemble 
the f a t h e r s themselves; they are s o p h i s m s . 6 6 
Who e x a c t l y are these p r o g e n i t o r s o f s o p h i s t r y ? They are i n d i v i d u a l s 
who are " c a l c u l a t i n g and b o l d and by nature s k i l l e d i n d e a l i n g with people." 
A c c o r d i n g l y they t r e a t t h e i r s u p e r i o r s with f l a t t e r y . In t h i s way they 
d e c e i v e them i n t o b e l i e v i n g t h a t they, the S o p h i s t s , are o f "the g r e a t e s t 
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v a l u e " w h i l e they themselves have no i d e a as to "what i s b e s t . " Mean-
w h i l e , toward o t h e r people, S o p h i s t s tend t o be "quarrelsome, d i s p u t a t i o u s , 
argumentative and combative"; f o r they have a consuming i n t e r e s t i n j u s t one 
t h i n g : p e r s o n a l g a i n . 6 8 
What does A r i s t o t l e say about these " c o u n t e r f e i t p h i l o s o p h e r s " i n 
comparison w i t h "the t r u e ? " 6 9 He suggests t h a t the o u t s i d e observer could 
e a s i l y mistake the one f o r the o t h e r s i n c e they are both t a l k i n g about the 
very same t h i n g s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , there i s a profound d i f f e r e n c e between them; 
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i t c o n s i s t s " i n t h e i r chosen way o f l i f e . " S o p h i s t s c o n s i d e r i t "more 
p r o f i t a b l e t o seem to be wise r a t h e r than to be so without seeming to be 
s o . " 7 1 L i k e the a t h l e t e who i s so bent on v i c t o r y t h a t he w i l l use every 
means, f o u l o r f a i r , to win a c o n t e s t , so the S o p h i s t w i l l stop a t nothing 
i n o r d e r t o win an argument. Every such seeming v i c t o r y enhances h i s repu-
t a t i o n f o r e x c e l l e n c e i n debate; and such a r e p u t a t i o n can l e a d to a l a r g e r 
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income. In A r i s t o t l e ' s view, the n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s o f the S o p h i s t need 
not be i n f e r i o r to those o f the true p h i l o s o p h e r ; however, h i s choices 
always a r e . 
In the end, we f i n d o u r s e l v e s back where we s t a r t e d : what k i n d o f 
c h o i c e s are made by the person who claims the name "phi l o s o p h e r " ? The 
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v a l u e o f t h i s " g r e a t e s t o f the a r t s , " and even i t s e x i s t e n c e , seem to 
d e r i v e from a person's m o t i v a t i o n . The g o a l o f the p h i l o s o p h e r i s t r u t h and 
wisdom. The o b j e c t i v e o f the S o p h i s t i s a prosperous c a r e e r . 
Conclusion 
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No doubt there are o t h e r aspects o f the a f f e c t i v e s i d e o f ph i l o s o p h y 
on which the mediaevals and the Greeks agree. For example, they share the 
c l e a r r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t from a pedagogical p o i n t o f view, the a c t o f b e l i e v -
i n g another person g e n e r a l l y precedes the a c t o f knowing what he i s t a l k i n g 
about; thus, we l i s t e n to a speaker f o r the most p a r t i n the e x p e c t a t i o n o f 
l e a r n i n g some t r u t h from him. As Augustine w i l l say o f t h i s merely human 
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b e l i e f : without i t we s h a l l never have a f r i e n d n or ever be one. I t was 
o n l y i n p a s s i n g that I a l l u d e d to t h i s f u n c t i o n o f b e l i e f as a path to 
knowledge. 
Another s i m i l a r i t y between our two h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d s i s t h e i r candid 
r e f e r e n c e t o the r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s o f t h e i r time. T h i s i s not to say t h a t 
they engage i n a narrow a p o l o g e t i c s while doing p h i l o s o p h y ; t h a t would be 
ou t o f p l a c e . I t i s r a t h e r t o say t h a t i n the s t r u g g l e f o r e t h i c a l and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l e x c e l l e n c e they were open to sage a d v i c e from any q u a r t e r , no 
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matter who the source might be. But, as the s a y i n g goes, t h a t i s another 
s t o r y . 
For the p r e s e n t , I have l i m i t e d t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o a s i n g l e i s s u e : 
the concurrence o f the a n c i e n t s and the mediaevals i n s e e i n g p h i l o s o p h y as 
a way o f l i f e i n which e t h i c a l i n t e g r i t y prepares f o r and p u r i f i e s and 
nourishes the lov e o f l e a r n i n g ; and, c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , the f o l l y t h a t i s pro -
duced by those who lack t h i s i n t e g r i t y . 
T h i s l e a v e s us with two q u e s t i o n s . F i r s t , i f such a demanding con-
c e p t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y f l o u r i s h e d f o r two m i l l e n n i a and then seemed to evapor-
ate, does t h a t mean t h a t i t cannot s u r v i v e i n the t w e n t i e t h century? Secondly, 
i f a b l e n d o f the a c t i v e and the contemplative l i v e s r e a l l y c o n s t i t u t e s human 
happiness, s h o u l d not some s i g n o f t h i s be found even o u t s i d e the h i s t o r y o f 
Western p h i l o s o p h y ? 
Regarding the s u r v i v a l o f t h i s n o t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y i n t o the presen t , 
there are two s i g n s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t i t i s s t i l l a l i v e . The f i r s t i s from a 
man who never claimed to be a p r o f e s s i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r but who was f o r t u n -
a t e l y w i s e r than some o f us who a s p i r e t o t h i s p r o f e s s i o n . G.K. Chesterton 
wrote: "Nothing s u b l i m e l y a r t i s t i c has ever a r i s e n out o f mere a r t , any 
more than a n y t h i n g e s s e n t i a l l y reasonable has ever a r i s e n out o f the pure 
reason. There must always be a r i c h moral s o i l f o r any g r e a t a e s t h e t i c 
growth. 
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Another s i g n o f the v i t a l i t y o f the Greeks we f i n d i n the grim r e p o r t s 
o f r e c e n t newspapers. I r e f e r t o the case o f J u l i u s Tomin, a p r o f e s s o r o f 
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p h i l o s o p h y a t C h a r l e s U n i v e r s i t y i n C z e c h o s l o v a k i a . He was removed from 
h i s p o s i t i o n when the Russians entered t h a t country i n 1968; he was unaccept-
able because he was tea c h i n g the works o f P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e . He was 
reduced t o doing a menial job from midnight t o morning. Next, because 
students c o n t i n u e d coming to h i s home to read these authors with him, a 
twenty-four hour guard was p l a c e d a t h i s door to harass anyone l e a v i n g o r 
e n t e r i n g . Since he p e r s i s t e d i n h i s subversive a c t i v i t y , h i s sons were 
e x p e l l e d from t h e i r s c h o o l s . S t i l l , he continued t o teach. But, f i n a l l y , 
h i s w i fe was beaten w i t h i n an i n c h o f her l i f e . Only then d i d he accept 
o u t s i d e h e l p to l e a v e Prague f o r Oxford. Such evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t o ur 
Greek t h i n k e r s s t i l l have the power to i n v i g o r a t e and even to l i b e r a t e the 
minds o f today's s t u d e n t s . 
As t o the g e n e r a l i t y o f the b e l i e f t h a t human happiness must i n c l u d e 
both the moral and the i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r t u e s , there are some a n c i e n t stone 
c a r v i n g s t h a t have bean i n t e r p r e t e d as symbols o f t h i s combination. I r e f e r 
f i r s t to the A r c h a i c Greek s t a t u e s from the s i x t h century B.C. They have 
the l e f t l e g advanced as though to walk and the r i g h t l e g f i r m l y p l a n t e d as 
though to s t a y . Secondly, and a t the very same time, but on the o t h e r s i d e o f 
the world, the Chinese sage K'ung Fu-tse (Confucius) i s p i c t o r i a l l y engraved 
i n stone i n the v e r y same p o s i t i o n . These f i g u r e s seem to say t h a t we must 
have the moral v i r t u e s f o r the sake o f moving us forward; but a t the same 
time we need the i n t e l l e c t u a l v i r t u e s t o r o o t us i n r e a l i t y . Perhaps those 
e a r l i e r o b servers i n Greece and China saw something t h a t we no l o n g e r see: 
t h a t we s h a l l not be complete human beings u n t i l we achieve both kinds o f 
e x c e l l e n c e . 
But our o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n was simply t o f i n d the c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t 
e t h i c a l l y good conduct p r o v i d e s to s c h o l a r s h i p . That c o n t r i b u t i o n , says 
Thomas Aquinas w h i l e commenting on A r i s t o t l e , i s l i k e t h a t which the 
p h y s i c i a n makes to h e a l t h . The p h y s i c i a n i s not the p r i n c i p a l cause o f 
h e a l t h ; but he does l a y down r u l e s f o r i t s sake. Thomas w r i t e s : 
The a r t o f medicine commands how h e a l t h may be brought about i n 
such a way as to give orders f o r the sake o f h e a l t h but not to 
i t . S i m i l a r l y , p r a c t i c a l wisdom, o r p o l i t i c s , does not make use 
o f t h e o r e t i c a l wisdom by p r e s c r i b i n g how i t ought to judge o f 
d i v i n e t h i n g s but r a t h e r does g i v e orders f o r i t s sake by 
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r e g u l a t i n g the way i n which men w i l l be a b l e to a r r i v e a t theo-
r e t i c a l wisdom. Hence, j u s t as h e a l t h i s p r e f e r a b l e to the a r t o f 
medicine s i n c e i t i s i t s end, i n the same way t h e o r e t i c a l wisdom 
79 
i s more e x c e l l e n t than p r a c t i c a l wisdom. 
P r a c t i c a l wisdom shows us how to make the humanly good c h o i c e s t h a t aim 
us i n the d i r e c t i o n o f e x c e l l e n c e . Once we are so p o s i t i o n e d we s h a l l be 
a b l e to f o l l o w the most demanding r u l e s o f " b e a u t i f u l and f r e e d i s c u s s i o n . " 
Duquesne u n i v e r s i t y 
NOTES 
1 The meanings o f "philosophy" and " m o r a l i t y " i n t h i s account are 
based e n t i r e l y on the t e x t s o f P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e c i t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g 
n o t e s . References to Greek terms are taken from the e d i t i o n s o f the Loeb 
C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y . E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n s o f P l a t o are from the e d i t i o n o f 
E d i t h Hamilton and Huntington C a i r n s , The Collected Dialogues of Plato, 
Including the Letters (New York 1961). The E n g l i s h v e r s i o n s o f A r i s t o t l e 
are from Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotlet The Revised 
Oxford Translation, 2 v o l s . ( P r i n c e t o n 1984). 
2 
B o e t h i u s , De consolatione philosophiae, I, w i t h the E n g l i s h t r a n s -
l a t i o n o f "I.T." (1609) r e v i s e d by H.F. Stewart (Cambridge, Mass. 1949) 130. 
3 S i s t e r Mary P a t r i c i a Garvey, R.S.M., Saint Augustine: Christian or 
Neo-platonist (Milwaukee 1939) 40: " A l l admit t h a t approximately i n 386 A.D. 
a r e f o r m a t i o n o c c u r r e d i n the conduct o f the Milanese P r o f e s s o r o f R h e t o r i c , 
t h a t he began a t t h a t time to embrace a new moral l i f e . " 
4 
The t i t l e o f t h i s paper o b v i o u s l y o r i g i n a t e s from the t i t l e o f the 
book by Jean L e c l e r c q , The Love of Learning and the Desire for God (New York 
1961; r p t . 1974). 
5 Gustave Bardy, La conversion au Christianisme durant les premiers 
siecles ( P a r i s 1949) 46-47. In f a c t , the word " c o n v e r s i o n " i s o f t e n used by 
35 
t r a n s l a t o r s to render metabibadzo, "to l e a d i n a d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n . " See 
A r i s t o t l e , Eudemian Ethics, 1116b31 and Topics 8, 11, 161a33; and P l a t o , 
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